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JAMES v. VALTIERRA 1
The right of the poor to secure adequate housing is undoubtedly
among the more bitterly debated legal and social issues confronting
our society. The public housing question raised in James v. Valtierra2
brought to a boil the conflict between the philosophy of social change
engineered for two decades by the Warren Court and the new equal
protection concepts formulated by the present Court. In Valtierra the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment3 vitiated a California constitu-
tional amendment which required referendum approval prior to local
filing for federal low-income housing funds. By holding the amend-
ment constitutional,4 the Court not only left intact a roadblock to future
reduced-cost housing projects but also countenanced an equal protec-
tion standard which brings to a halt the journey begun by the prior
Court.
The Housing Act of 1937,1 also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act,
established the United States Housing Authority," which was authorized
to provide funds to state agencies in the form of loans and grants to
promote low-rent public housing projects.7 Soon thereafter the Cali-
fornia legislature created in each city and county a local housing
1. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . .. deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. 402 U.S. at 143.
5. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, § 1-30, 50 Stat. 888-99, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 et seq. (1970). The low-rent housing provisions are contained in 42 U.S.C.
9H 1401-30 (1970).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970).
7. Under the program, construction is normally financed through the sale of bonds
issued by a local housing authority. The federal government contracts to cover all
interest and principal on the bonds, while local governing bodies must agree to coop-
erate with the venture, and to supply municipal utilities, police and fire protection, and
school services. 402 U.S. at 143 n.4. The local governing body must forego all
property taxes applicable to the project. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970). For a
general discussion of the purposes, operation, accomplishments and failures of the
Wagner-Steagall Act, see Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview,
54 CALIF. L. Ray. 642 (1966).
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authority' empowered to apply for federal funds under the Wagner-
Steagall Act and to disburse the proceeds for the construction and
maintenance of public housing within the authority's jurisdiction.9
In 1950, a California group sought to oppose, through a city-wide
referendum, the Housing Authority of the City of Eureka's request for
federal public housing funds. Their attempt was thwarted, however, by
the California Supreme Court in Housing Authority v. Superior Court.10
There, the Court held that the referendum provisions of the California
Constitution"1 reserve to the people only the power to test legislative
acts,' 2 and thus are inapplicable to the Housing Authority's request for
Wagner-Steagall funds, which was a purely administrative action.' 3
As a result of this decision, Proposition 10 was placed by a voter in-
itiative on the November, 1950, state election ballot. Passing with a
vote of only 50.6% of the electorate,'" Proposition 10 added Article
XXXIV to the state constitution. This article requires that before fed-
eral funds for any low-income public housing project may be sought by
any state, city, or county housing authority, approval by a majority of
the voters of the city or county concerned must be secured through the
device of a popular referendum.' 5 By its terms the article applies only to
"low rent housing project[s]" designed as accommodations "for persons
of low income. . . ." Such persons are defined as "persons or families
who lack the amount of income which is necessary. . . to enable them,
8. CAL. HELTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 34240 (West 1967). The governing body
of the city or county concerned must first resolve that there is a need for a housing
authority to function within its jurisdiction. Id.
9. Id. §§ 34312-30. Section 34327 sets forth the nature and scope of the power
of the local authorities to obtain funds from the federal government.
10. 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950).
11. CAL. CONsr. art. IV, § 1. In 1966 the California Constitution was amended
and renumbered. The referendum provisions are now found in Article IV, Sections
23-25 of the California Constitution.
12. 35 Cal. 2d at 557, 219 P.2d at 460-61.
13. Id. at 558-59, 219 P.2d at 461-62. However, an equally plausible view would be
to characterize the local housing authority as a mere creature of the legislature, thus
deeming the acts of that authority as acts of the legislature itself. Such a result would
expose the decisions of the local authority to referendum approval.
14. The statewide vote was 1,526,209 for passage, with 1,489,799 against. L.A.
Times, Nov. 10, 1950, at 7, col. 1.
15. CAL. CoNsT. art. XXXIV, § 1, which provides in part:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or ac-
quired in any manner by any state public body until a majority of the qualified
electors of the city, town, or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed
to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such
project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at
any general or special election.
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without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings,
without overcrowding.'
16
Mrs. Anita Valtierra 7 was a resident of Santa Clara County and of
the city of San Jose, and a person "of low income" within the meaning of
Article XXXIV.' 8  She was determined by the Housing Authority of
the City of San Jose to be eligible for public housing, and, since no units
were available for occupancy at the time of her application, her name
was placed on an appropriate waiting list.' 9 One cause of the paucity
of low-income housing in Santa Clara County was the defeat by the
county's voters in 1968 of an Article XXXIV referendum seeking ap-
proval of the Housing Authority's application for federal housing
funds.20 Mrs. Valtierra brought an action before the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, sitting as a three-judge
court, seeking (1) an equitable decree declaring Article XXXIV to be
repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and (2) an injunction forbidding
the Housing Authority of the City of San Jose, its members in their of-
ficial capacity, the City Council of San Jose, and its members in their
official capacity, from relying on Article XXXIV and its referendum
provisions as a justification for failure to obtain federal public housing
funds.2 Mrs. Valtierra's complaint, which was founded upon the fed-
eral civil rights statute,22 alleged that Article XXXIV was unconstitu-
tional in three respects: (1) it violated the Supremacy Clause2" in that
16. Id.
17. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), involved numerous parties
plaintiff and appellees, respectively, all of whom were "persons of low income."
Throughout this Note all references to "Anita Valtierra' or to "Mrs. Valtierra" should
be understood to include all parties plaintiff in Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San
Jose, supra, and all appellees in James v. Valtierra, supra.
18. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2-3. The Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
its Secretary, George Romney, were also joined as defendants. Since Mrs. Valtierra's
complaint had sought no relief against the federal defendants, and since their joinder
was not necessary in order to grant the relief requested, the complaint as to them
was dismissed. 313 F. Supp. at 3.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This statute authorizes a civil action arising out of the
deprivation, under color of state law, of any right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
by the United States Constitution. The federal district court is granted original juris-
diction of such actions (28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)), and where plaintiffs seek to enjoin
local officials from enforcing a state statute or state constitutional provision on the
grounds of that provision's repugnance to the Federal Constitution, the action must
be heard by a federal district court of three judges, convened in accordance with the
terms of section 2284 of title 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
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it evidenced California's attempt to frustrate or otherwise qualify the
manifest will of Congress expressed in the Wagner-Steagall Act,24 (2) it
denied her certain privileges and immunities of United States citizen-
ship,25 and (3) it invidiously discriminated against her on the basis of
wealth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2"
The three-judge court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Judge
Peckham, found plaintiff's Supremacy Clause argument "unpersua-
sive,' '2T and failed to reach her claim under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.28 The court determined, however, that Article XXXIV
violated the Equal Protection Clause on the grounds that its enforce-
ment resulted in "the unequal imposition of burdens upon groups that
are not rationally differentiable in the light of any legitimate State leg-
islative objective."2  The court observed that "[ilt is no longer a per-
missible legislative objective to contain or exclude persons simply be-
cause they are poor."30  Relying on Hunter v. Erickson,31 the court
found Article XXXIV defective on three conjunctive points: (1) the
referendum was a "special burden" since it was not a prerequisite to re-
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970):
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare
of the Nation by employing its funds and credit . . . to assist the several States
and their political subdivisions to alleviate present and recurring unemployment
and to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute short-
age of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, in urban,
rural nonfarm, and Indian areas, that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals
of the citizens of the Nation. . . . It is the policy of the United States to vest in
the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of the low-rent housing program ...
Similar sentiments are expressed in CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE ANN. § 34201 (West
1967).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. See note 3 supra. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable,
under its terms, only to actions sanctioned by a state or any instrumentality of a state.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In addition, the statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)) on which Mrs. Valtierra's cause of action was founded extends only to situa-
tions in which "state action" is present. See note 22 supra. In Valtierra the alleged
discrimination took place under the auspices of a local housing authority, created and
acting under the terms of both a state statute and a state constitutional provision. See
notes 8-9, 15 supra. Hence "state action" was clearly present and was not an "issue" in
the district court.
27. 313 F. Supp. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id., citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
30. 313 F. Supp. at 4, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
31. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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quests by most other state agencies seeking federal funds; 82 (2) "the
impact of the law falls upon minorities ... ;83 and (3) in response to
the defendants' contention that the referendum is a manifestation of
equality under the law rather than discrimination, the court stated:
"[I]nsisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it desires
and that the people may retain for themselves the power over certain
subjects may generally be true, but these principles furnish no justifi-
cation for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation of this change
through popular referendum immunize it. . . . The sovereignty of
the people is itself subject to . . .constitutional limitations. .... -. 4
The court recognized that while California is not compelled to seek fed-
eral housing funds, it is nevertheless bound by the strictures of the Equal
Protection Clause once it chooses to do so.35  Apparently assuming that
Article XXXIV was not the product of unconstitutional motivations, the
court noted that "lack of bad motive has never been held to cure an
otherwise discriminatory scheme. '30  Accordingly, the court declared
Article XXXIV unconstitutional and enjoined defendants from relying
upon its terms as a reason for not requesting federal assistance with
which to finance low-income public housing.
37
32. 313 F. Supp. at 5. The court noted several specific examples of projects for
which federal funds may be secured without a required referendum. These included
highways, urban renewal, hospitals, colleges, universities, secondary schools, law en-
forcement assistance, and model cities. Id.
33. Id. In support of this finding the court specifically noted the affidavit of Mr.
Franklin Lockfeld, Senior Planner for the Santa Clara County Planning Department,
in which he described the recent low-income housing difficulties in Santa Clara County:
The low income areas are closely related to the areas of concentration of minority
residents and high income areas are closely related to the nearly all white sections
of the community. * * * In 1960, only 5% of the units occupied by white-non-
Mexican-Americans were in delapidated or deteriorated condition, while 23% of
the units occupied by Mexican-Americans and 20% of the units occupied by non-
whites were in delapidated or deteriorated condition. Minorities were thus over
represented in the less than standard housing by greater than four to one, and
occupied nearly one-third of the deteriorating and delapidated housing in the County
in 1960. Id. n.2.
34. 313 F. Supp. at 5, quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969). The
Hunter Court cited Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964),
as support. In Lucas, a state legislative reapportionment scheme, adopted by the
voters of Colorado through referendum, was held contrary to the Equal Protection
Clause under the doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In response
to the argument that the people of the state had consented to any violation of the so-
called "one man-one vote" rule, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Lucas Court,
declared: "A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a
majority of the people choose that [they] be." 377 U.S. at 736-37 (footnote omitted).
35. 313 F. Supp. at 5.
36. Id. at 6. It is not entirely certain, however, that Article XXXIV is devoid of
"unconstitutional motivations." See text accompanying note 135 infra.
37. 313 F. Supp. at 6.
NOTES
The City Council of San Jose and Mrs. Virginia C. Shaffer, a member
of that council, each appealed the judgment to the United States Su-
preme Court, 8 which reversed the district courts order and remanded
the two cases for dismissal.39 In so doing, the Court turned aside the
hopes of many legal writers, 40 civil rights advocates, 41 and thousands of
the nation's urban poor, and simultaneously placed tenuous contours on
the application of the Equal Protection Clause to statutory discrimina-
tions based solely on wealth. While referendum requirements similar to
Article XXXIV exist in other states,4" the number of such jurisdictions
will very likely increase as a result of the instant decision.
43
Mrs. Valtierra's Supremacy Clause argument centered on her asser-
tion that the Housing Act of 1937 represented a statement of commit-
ment on the part of the federal government to eradicate slums and other
inadequate housing from the cities of the nation. She contended that
where a state constitutional provision conflicts with the expressed will
38. Both appeals were taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which allows
for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any three judge district court decree.
Probable jurisdiction was noted in James v. Valtierra, 398 U.S. 949 (1970), and in
Shaffer v. Valtierra, 399 U.S. 925 (1970). Because of the substantial identity of
issues, the two appeals were argued and decided together.
39. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971). Joining Justice Black in the
opinion of the Court were the Chief Justice and Justices Harlan, White and Stewart.
With Justice Marshall in dissent were Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Justice Douglas
did not take part in the decision.
40. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michman,
The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGIITS-CIv.
Lmi. L. REv. 207 (1970); Roisman, The Right to Public Housing, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 691 (1971); Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
COmELL L. REv. 343 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84
HAv. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
41. See, e.g., Wilkins, Supreme Court Housing Ruling Closes Suburb Doors to
Blacks, L A. Times, May 10, 1971, § 2, at 7, col. 3. While Mr. Wilkins' constitutional
theory may be disputed, his comments noted in the Los Angeles Times crystallize the
initial reaction of the black community to the Valtierra decision.
42. See, e.g., 26 MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 462, § 465(2) (1966); NEB. REV. STAT.
ch. 71, § 1509 (1966) (limited to municipal housing authorities only); VA. CODE ANN.
tit. 36, § 19.4 (repl. 1966) (limited to cities between 70,000 and 90,000 in popula-
tion). No state, other than California, has as yet raised such a provision to state
constitutional status. The legislatures of Minnesota, Nebraska, and Virginia, unlike
their California counterpart, retain control over the future of their respective state
public housing programs.
43. At least twenty-one states have initiative and referendum procedures similar to
California's. Fordham & Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OEO
ST. L.J. 495, 496 (1950). The way is thus paved in these states for enactment of
statutory or constitutional provisions similar to California's Article XxxIV, without
a wholesale reform of a given state's governmental processes,
19721
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
of Congress acting under its enumerated powers, the Supremacy Clause
should invalidate the contrary state provision.44  The Federal Housing
Act of 1937, however, does not specifically require the states to apply
for the funds which the Act makes available. Rather, federal policy
since 1937 has been to assist the states financially in what remains an
essentially local program for the alleviation of poor housing condi-
tions. 40 As such, the Valtierra Court apparently agreed unanimously
that Article XXXIV was immune from attack on Supremacy Clause
grounds.
46
Mrs. Valtierra's claim that Article XXXIV violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was summarily dismissed by the Court as "with-
out merit. '47 Such treatment is consonant, however, with the "dead-
letter" status which the Privileges and Immunities Clause has enjoyed
for some time. This Fourteenth Amendment clause, forbidding state
invasion of fundamental rights of United States citizenship,48 has long
been overshadowed in legal significance by the Due Process and Equal
44. See Taylor v. Thomas, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 479 (1874); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
45. See note 24 supra. The Act does, however, require local public housing agencies
to provide,
to the maximum extent consistent with the achievement of the objectives of this
chapter, . . . low rent housing . . . where such housing . . . can be provided
at a cost equal to or less than housing in projects assisted under other provisions
of this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(1) (1970).
This provision does not apply where the local governing body has failed to approve
these statutory terms by resolution. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(2) (1970). In Valtierra,
the San Jose City Council supported the City Housing Authority throughout the litiga-
tion, and presumably made no section 1421b(a) (2) resolution, at least as to the project
for which appellees had applied.
46. 402 U.S. at 140.
47. Id. Mrs. Valtierra asserted that a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling, free of
overcrowding, is a privilege coextensive with United States citizenship. In her case,
and in that of any member of the nation's rural or urban poor, the existence of such a
right necessarily implies the right to secure the construction of such dwellings where
they do not presently exist.
48. The sole inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause is whether the privilege claimed is one which arises by virtue of the national
citizenship of the claimant. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled on
other grounds, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). The first eight amendments
of the Bill of Rights are not applicable to the states through this clause, however,
since their ambit is not dependent upon the national citizenship of a claimant. Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Thus, arguments based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause have rarely been suc-
cessful before the Supreme Court. See note 52 infra.
Examples of privileges accorded protection under this clause are the right to pass
freely between states, or to reside in any state, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)
(dictum), and the right to enter the public lands of the United States, Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (dictum).
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Protection Clauses which protect the interests of all "persons."' 49 The
early Fourteenth Amendment decisions were quick to conceive this dis-
tinction between the relative breadth and applicability of the Amend-
ment's clauses.50 A determination that the rights to secure decent hous-
ing and to compel local governments to construct such housing are so
fundamental as to be deemed a privilege inherent in United States citi-
zenship would of necessity compel a holding that such rights are pro-
tected by either or both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. Hence the Valtierra Court adopted a course which would lead
to the result of most general application,5 1 and rested the outcome of
the case on its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
52
In rejecting the appellees' equal protection claim, the Valtierra
majority rested heavily upon a strict interpretation of its prior decision
in Hunter v. Erickson.53 There, the Court was called upon to decide the
constitutionality of an Akron, Ohio, city charter amendment which re-
quired a majority referendum prior to the enactment of
[a]ny ordinance. . . which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, trans-
fer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property...
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. .... 54
Finding that the charter amendment distinguished between those who
sought protection against racial bias in the sale and rental of real
49. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 3 supra.
50. See, e.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This case held
for the first time that the restrictions on federal power contained in the Bill of Rights
were not per se privileges and immunities of United States citizens for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. Although much of the case has subsequently been overruled,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause has, since 1873, been for practical purposes a
Constitutional dead letter. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
51. This same process was followed in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
There, the Court considered statutes of two states and of the District of Columbia
which imposed a one year residency requirement on welfare recipients prior to pay-
ment of welfare funds. While the Court recognized that these provisions impinged on
the right of welfare recipients to travel freely between states, and thus considered itself
able to overturn the regulations on privileges and immunities grounds, it preferred to
rest its decision on the Equal Protection Clause.
52. See 402 U.S. at 140. Cf. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled
on other grounds, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), wherein the Court utilized
the Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate a state statute which restricted the
right of a citizen resident in one state to contract in another. The dissenting opinion
of Justice Stone in Colgate pointed out that of the at least 44 cases previously brought
to the Supreme Court in which state statutes have been assailed on Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities grounds, Colgate was the first explicitly to
hold any state action in violation of that clause. 296 U.S. at 445-46.
53. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
54. Id. at 387, quoting Akron, Ohio, City Charter § 137 (Nov. 1964).
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estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in
the pursuit of other ends, the Hunter Court held Akron's scheme to be
repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.55 The Court looked beyond
the seemingly neutral language of the charter and perceptively recog-
nized that
although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in
an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the
minority. The majority needs no protection against discrimination
and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than
that.5
6
Thus confronting reality, the Court encountered little difficulty in over-
turning a provision which, on its face, simply authorized a popular elec-
tion based on a referendum right retained by the people.
57
Entwined in the Hunter facts, however, was an Akron fair housing
ordinance passed prior to enactment of the charter amendment;' s the
enforcement of this ordinance was effectively barred by the referendum
requirement of the challenged charter provision."" Justice Black, dis-
senting in Hunter, criticized the majority opinion for effectively com-
pelling the -city of Akron to retain and enforce the fair housing ordi-
nance-an ordinance which the Court apparently wished to revive: 00
Although the Court denies the fact, I read its opinion as holding that
a city that "wields state power" is barred from repealing an existing
ordinance that forbids discrimination. .... (1
Voicing his well-sounded objection to a panacean application of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 62 Justice Black further re-
proached the Hunter majority for its utilization of these clauses
55. 393 U.S. at 390-91, 393. Justice White's opinion for the majority stressed the
existence of an "explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters differ-
ently from other racial and housing matters." Id. at 389.
56. Id. at 391.
57. Id. at 392.
58. Id. at 386-87. Akron, Ohio, Ordinance No. 873-1964 § 1 (July 14, 1964) set
forth the city's policy to "assure equal opportunity to all persons to live in decent
housing facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin." Other
sections of this ordinance, as amended by Akron, Ohio, Ordinance No. 926-1964, con-
ferred on the office of the Mayor, through a Commission on Equal Opportunity in
Housing, power to enforce the anti-discrimination sections of the ordinance through
conciliation, persuasion, or, if necessary, executive order.
59. Id. at 387.
60. Id. at 396. Justice Black likened such action to the issuance by the Court of
a writ of mandamus or an injunction in order to enforce what it favored as a fair
housing law. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (equal
[Vol. 5
NOTES
to strike down state laws that shock the Court's conscience or offend
the Court's sense of what it considers to be "fair" or "fundamental' or
"arbitrary" or "contrary to the beliefs of the English-speaking people.
"63
Speaking for the majority in Valtierra, however, Justice Black was able
to distinguish Hunter from the situation before the Court:
Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said that Califor-
nia's Article XXXIV rests on "distinctions based on race." . . . [T]he
record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral
on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority . .. The present case
could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this we decline to
do.
6 4
However, while the Hunter plaintiffs relied on the racial classification
implicit in the Akron charter provision, the statute also fostered dis-
criminations grounded on several other motivations.65 In fact, a liberal
interpretation of Hunter would broaden its mandate to statutes discrimi-
nating on the basis of any "suspect classification." 66  Additionally,
while the original motivation behind Article XXXIV was economic
rather than racial,67 statistical studies have manifested that statutes
protection) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965)
(due process) (Black, J., dissenting).
63. 393 U.S. at 396.
64. 402 U.S. at 141.
65. 393 U.S. at 390 ("racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations").
66. State statutes which discriminate on the basis of certain classifications are subject
to rigid scrutiny by the courts. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religion); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(poverty); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (class or caste).
67. See generally Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAuIF.
L R v. 642 (1966). The Wagner-Steagall Act was passed during the Great Depres-
sion, and thus its principal target was the submerged middle class temporarily experi-
encing poverty. Id. at 646. The rarified economy of World War II ended this condi-
tion, and, in fact, left a severe suburban housing shortage after the termination of
hostilities. As general prosperity continued, this submerged middle class was re-
leased, and its place in the housing program was taken by the "problem poor." Id. at
650. Choice suburban land was reserved for veterans' housing, while the low-income
program became boxed into the inner cities. Since by 1950 non-whites were not
yet disproportionately represented in existing low-income projects, restrictions such as
California's Article XXXIV were adopted in order to control incursions of the perma-
nently poor into the suburbs. Id. at 651. Nevertheless, Article XXXIV was to some
extent directed against inner city developments. Since the Housing Act of 1937 re-
quired local authorities to waive all taxation of project property, one objective of Article
XXXIV was to require approval by the electorate of the long-term removal of land
from the county tax rolls. 52 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 133, 134 (1969).
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which discriminate against potential low-income tenants effectively re-
strict the housing opportunities of racial and ethnic minorities. 0 Ap-
parently then, Hunter would require a careful examination not only of
those statutes which discriminate on the basis of race, but also of those
whose impact in reality falls on a minority.69
It has long been recognized that classifications are necessary for
virtually all legislation. 7°  Since "legislation may impose special burdens
upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends," legislative
discrimination per se is not unconstitutional. 71  However, where the
statutory discrimination becomes "invidious" in nature, it violates the
mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.7 2 Generally, a statute is pre-
sumed constitutional, and the party asserting an equal protection viola-
tion bears the burden of showing its unconstitutionality. 7 Should a
provision bear a rational relation to the attainment of a legitimate govern-
mental objective, it will, under the traditional doctrine, be held in ac-
cord with the Equal Protection Clause.74 However, where a legisla-
68. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
468 (1968) (unofficial rept.): "Nationwide, 25 percent of all nonwhites living in
central cities occupied substandard units in 1960 compared to 8 percent of all whites."
69. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 391.
70. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965); Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U.S. 340 (1908).
71. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
72. "Invidious discrimination," that discrimination to which the Court, for various
reasons, attaches some measure of constitutional opprobrium, generally results where
the classification is one which has three qualities:
(1) a general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any proper governmental objec-
tive; (2) a high degree of adaptation to uses which are oppressive in the sense of
systematic and unfair devaluation, through majority rule, of the claims of certain
persons to nondiscriminatory sharing in the benefits and burdens of social ex-
istence; (3) a potency to injure through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons
by implying popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeserving-
ness. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 20 (1969).
73. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957), quoting Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911):
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. . . . One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
74. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955). In Anderson, supra, the Court overturned a Louisiana statute re-
quiring that all nomination papers and election ballots state the race of each candidate.
The Court, finding no rational relation between the requirement and any legitimate
state interest, characterized the issue as whether the statute operated to "require or
encourage" racial discrimination. 375 U.S. at 402.
Often the Court is faced with a legislative provision which is fair on its face, or
arguably applicable to all persons equally, but is nevertheless discriminatory because of
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tive scheme either involves a sufficient "suspect classification" or frus-
trates the exercise of a "fundamental interest," the burden of establishing
its justification will shift. This counterplay has been variously de-
nominated as a "rigid scrutiny," an "active review," or the "compelling
state interest test."' 75 Its object is to determine whether a given statute
is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the attainment of an
overriding purpose.
76
Certain classifications, such as race or religion, are suspect and will
independently demand a search for a compelling state interest by the re-
viewing court.77  However, whether a classification based on wealth
is suspect so as to independently invoke the compelling state interest
test is yet unsettled.78 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,79 the
Court declared that indigents could not be deprived of the right to vote
in state elections because of their inability to pay a poll tax. Recogniz-
ing the discrimination based upon wealth, the Court stated: "Lines
drawn on the basis of wealth . .. are traditionally disfavored."' 0 It
the historical context of the statute's enactment, its biased purpose, or its oppressive
administration. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (the denial of
laundry licenses to Chinese applicants solely on the basis of racial hostility violated
the Equal Protection Clause).
75. The first case to apply, though only inferentially, the more stringent compelling
interest test was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). There, an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry challenged an order by a commanding general of the
United States Army, issued pursuant to a more general Executive Order, requiring the
exclusion of all "persons of Japanese ancestry" from a described West Coast area.
Justice Black, writing for a 5-3 Court, held that the racial classification compelled
"the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. The Court upheld the order, however, finding
a "compelling interest" due to the exigencies of war: "[H'Jardships are part of war,
and war is an aggregation of hardships." Id. at 219.
76. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HAxv. L. Rnv. 1065, 1086-90 (1969).
77. See cases cited note 66 supra.
78. In the area of "economic and social welfare," a state still retains a broad dis-
cretion to classify so long as its classification has a reasonable basis. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). If a classification on the basis of wealth is no
more than economic regulation, then such a -classification should not be considered
suspect. Cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1937)
(distinctions emanating from taxation schemes need only rest upon a rational basis).
However, it is submitted that where the area is one other than economic regulation,
or where a wealth classification impairs a "fundamental interest," such a classification
will indeed be deemed "suspect". Throughout this Note, the term "wealth classifica-
tion" or "classification based on wealth" is used to describe a statute or ordinance
which classifies, and hence discriminates against, certain persons or groups of persons
on the basis of their economic wealth.
79. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
80. Id. at 668.
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was not until McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 8 1 how-
ever, that the Court deemed wealth to be "suspect." There, in upholding
the denial of absentee ballots to non-sentenced jail inmates, the Court
opined in dictum:
[Careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines
are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, . . . two factors which would
independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby de-
mand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.
8 2
The Valtidrra majority chose not to recognize these earlier declarations
of the Court and failed to apply any scrutiny at all to the apparent class-
ification grounded in wealth. In his dissent Justice Marshall criticized
this judicial "oversight" and emphatically asserted that wealth is "a sus-
pect classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny. .. .
For decisional authority, the Justice called upon Harper, McDonald, and
Douglas v. California.84 However, while McDonald offers some support
for Justice Marshall's assertion,8 5 neither Harper nor Douglas indicate
that a wealth classification, taken alone, would invoke exacting judicial
scrutiny. Rather, both of these decisions turned most heavily on the
denial of the fundamental interests involved.8"
The unwillingness of the Valtierra majority to accord wealth a status
equivalent to race may have an explanation not expressed in the opinion.
A discrimination against the "poor" is often more difficult to perceive and
determine than one directed toward a racial or ethnic minority. Dif-
ferences in wealth are matters of degree,8 7 while race is a distinction in
81. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
82. Id. at 807. A recent California Supreme Court decision has declared that a
legislative scheme discriminating on the basis of wealth is "suspect" and requires the
state to justify the scheme by showing that it is necessary to the achievement of a
compelling state interest. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 610 (1971). In so holding, the court relied upon various United States
Supreme Court decisions, including McDonald. Serrano held that if the allegations in
the complaint were true, the California public school financing system which obtained
revenue for the operation of public schools primarily through real property taxes,
invidously discriminated against the poor because it made the quality of a child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d
at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. The court's declaration that wealth classifications are
suspect must be considered, however, in light of the court's complementary conclusion
that the school financing scheme also impaired a "fundamental interest," namely
education. Id. at 604-09, 487 P.2d at 1255-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-18.
83. 402 U.S. at 145.
84. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
85. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
86. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text infra.
87. See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HA~v. L. Ruv. 435, 437-38 (1967).
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kind. Men with blue eyes are easily separated from those with brown,
but no two men can agree as to what level of wealth distinguishes the
indigent from his more prosperous fellows. Race is congenital and
unalterable. Poverty is often transitory and always, in theory, curable.
It can be overcome by an individual without judicial aid, and a statute
discriminating on the basis of wealth would thus be rendered ineffective
as to him. The same reasoning is inapplicable to a racial classification.
Furthermore, statutes resulting in unequal treatment of persons on the
basis of wealth are extremely common. Any provision which sets a
uniform fee for the performance of some public service, such as the
issuance of a marriage license or approval of a building construction
permit, necessarily places a heavier burden on the poor than on the
rich.8 8 In the racial discrimination area, the compelling state interest
test has been held applicable even where the individual interests denied
as a result of the discrimination were relatively trivial, such as a right
of access to a public beach and bathhouse,89 or to a public amphi-
theater.90 If an analogous approach were available to invalidate a statu-
tory provision discriminating by degrees of wealth, the entire social and
economic framework of the nation might be shaken.91
It is submitted, however, that none of these traditional arguments
adequately explains the exclusion of wealth from consideration as a
suspect classification. Unlike race, the state of poverty itself bespeaks
inequality. The poor are "second-class" citizens even where free from
de jure discrimination:
One is poor not because he has no money, but because, possibly owing
to lack of money, he lacks also access to the social instrumentalities
that make humanly significant action possible.
92
A second factor which mitigates for judicial application of the com-
pelling state interest test, and one not mentioned by the Valtierra
majority, is the nature of the individual interest or right deprived by
88. See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 26840 (West 1968) (marriage license pro-
curement fees); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE ANN. § 7149 (West Supp. 1972) (sport fishing
license procurement fees); CAL. ELECtION CODE ANN. § 6552(c) (West 1964) (filing
fee for nomination papers of state legislative candidates).
89. Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), affd mem.,
350 U.S. 877 (1955).
90. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 220 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated
mem., 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
91. See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protect-
ing the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 21 (1969).
92. Haworth, Deprivation and the Good City, in POWER, POVERTY, AND URBAN POL-
icy 27, 39 (1968).
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enforcement of the statute in question. If the asserted interests being
denied are characterized as fundamental, regardless of whether their
deprivation is coupled with a suspect statutory classification, such a
denial will give rise to an application of the compelling state interest
test.9
3
The plaintiffs in both Hunter and Valtierra asserted the existence and
deprivation of a fundamental right, i.e., the right to secure access to
housing. In Hunter the housing was privately owned, had previously
been built, and was to be paid for by those desiring it. Plaintiffs' right
to purchase or rent the realty free of racial discrimination was guaranteed
to them under applicable state law prior to enactment of the city charter
amendment at issue.9 4 On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Valtierra
sought public housing which did not presently exist, and which depended
upon general community funds for its construction." Further, no
statute existed in California in 1950 which would have secured to Mrs.
Valtierra her asserted right to the construction of suitable low-income
housing. While numerous statutory policy statements and federal ex-
ecutive studies support the proposition that the right to secure the con-
struction of "decent, safe, and sanitary" housing warrants as much
significance as any interest previously deemed fundamental by the
Court,9" the Valtierra majority chose not to recognize the stature of such
an interest.
93. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to interstate
travel); Id. at 658 (Harlan, J., dissenting): "[S]tatutory classifications which either are
based upon 'suspect' criteria or affect 'fundamental rights' will be held to deny equal
protection unless justified by a 'compelling' governmental interest." Anders v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (equal access to appellate review); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
94. See note 58 supra.
95. 402 U.S. at 143.
96. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1441:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the
health and living standards of its people require housing production and related
community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the
elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance
of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of
a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus
contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the
advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.
See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-37 (1970). A strong argument can be made for the
proposition that adequate housing for all Americans is inextricably tied to the mainte-
nance of the freedoms which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect. Cf.
1 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMiISSION ON URBAN HousINo, TECHNICAL STUDIES
27 (1967); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 260
(1968) (unofficial report).. But see Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301
(W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 980
(1970). In Ranjel the district court was petitioned to enjoin a referendum which
NOTES
A further point of comparison between Valtierra and Hunter may be
found in Justice Harlan's concurrence in the latter decision. There,
Justice Harlan viewed the Akron city charter amendment as one of a
group of laws defining "the powers of political institutions .... ,,"7 This
approach enabled the Justice to classify such laws, for equal protection
purposes, into two groups: (1) those statutes having "the clear purpose
of making it more difficult for racial and religious minorities to further
their political aims...,"" and which could not stand in the absence of
"state interests of the most weighty and substantial kind . . ."99, and
(2) codifications designed to provide "a just framework within which the
diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete and are not en-
acted with the purpose of assisting one particular group... ."100 Justice
Harlan placed the Akron referendum requirement in the former cate-
gory, finding it "a provision that has the clear purpose of making it
more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve
legislation that is in their interest."10 The Justice not only underscored
the racial bias inherent in the Akron charter amendment, but also
emphasized the statute's effect on the political structure of the com-
munity. The resultant infringement of political rights operated to render
it more difficult for minorities to achieve beneficial legislation.
Perhaps this is not the situation in Valtierra. The Akron city charter
amendment in Hunter catholically frustrated the minority's objective,
while in Valtierra only one avenue of securing the minority's goal-
federal support of public housing-was threatened. Where in Hunter the
sole means of obtaining legislation on the housing question favorable to
racial minorities was impeded, the Valtierra plaintiffs have several ave-
nues other than public financing of low income developments open to
them.10 2 Nevertheless, federal support of local public housing through
attempted to repeal the city's rezoning law. The law was enacted to allow construction
of a low-income housing project on a 20-acre parcel in a predominantly white neighbor-
hood. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the failure to allow
minorities to secure equal access to housing was a vestige of slavery. Applying the
enabling clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, the court concluded that the referendum
could not be allowed to frustrate the federal purpose of removing the "badges and
incidents of slavery." 293 F. Supp. at 310. The sixth circuit reversed, holding that
a state referendum based on neutral principles should be immune from federal court
constraints. 417 F.2d at 324. Accord, Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
97. 393 U.S. at 393.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
102. Consider, inter alia, privately funded housing projects, private donations, low-
interest loans or interest-free grants from community self-help organizations or civil
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Wagner-Steagall funds is the fastest and most realistic method available
to provide construction of low-income units. Therefore, the net effect
of Article XXXIV on the indigent tenant may arguably be as serious as
that of the city charter amendment in Hunter, since the only practical
means open to the low-income minority to cure its housing needs is the
repeal of Article XXXIV, which must also be accomplished through
referendum.1 03  This apparent similarity was not enunciated by the
Valtierra majority, and the decision may rest primarily upon the failure of
Article XXXIV to literally constrain the ability of low-income persons
to legislate their housing objectives.
Such an analysis of the Valtierra and Hunter results is clearly contrari-
wise to the Court's earlier decision in Reitman v. Mulkey.1 4  Although
neither the Valtierra majority nor dissent utilized Reitman, the vitality of
that decision is certainly denigrated by the Valtierra result. In Reitman,
the Court was called upon to decide the fate of Article I, section 26 of
the California Constitution. Adopted in November, 1964, by a voter
initiative and referendum, section 26 provided in part that neither the
statot nor any agency thereof
shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any per-
son, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his
real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such
person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.1 05
Prior to the enactment of section 26, the California legislature in 1959
passed the Unruh Act which committed the state to the principle of
equal opportunity for all persons in the enjoyment of public accommoda-
tions.10 6 The enforcement of this Act, however, was effectively barred
by operation of section 26.107
rights groups. In Hunter, the plaintiffs could enforce their rights only through recourse
to governmental action, since this was the only effective method available to break
the barrier of private discrimination. California's Attorney General has held that
the provisions of Article XXXIV are inapplicable to projects where the eventual aim of
the builders is private ownership, with full payment of appropriate property taxes. 52
Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 133, 135 (1969).
103. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. While further legislation in the low-income hous-
ing area is not made impossible by Article XXXIV, the state constitution does prevent
construction of any low-income housing project by any state governmental agency
without compliance with the terms of the Article.
104. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
105. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26. This section was submitted to the people of Cali-
fornia as Proposition 14 on the November, 1964, statewide ballot. 387 U.S. at 371.
The provision was limited by its terms to non-state-owned residential property. Id.
106. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1970).
107. Although the respondents in Reitman brought an action based upon the provi-
sions of the Unruh Act (Civil Code sections 51 and 52), the Court, in finding section
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The Reitman Court held section 26 to be violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.108 Justice White's majority opinion examined the provi-
sion in light of its "immediate objective, ultimate effect, historical con-
text and the conditions existing prior to its enactment. ."10, and con-
cluded that section 26 established "a purported constitutional right to
privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be unavail-
able under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be involv-
ed..... "11o The requisite state action was demonstrated in the Court's
assessment of the ultimate effect of section 26:
Unruh and Rumford were thereby pro tanto repealed [by section 26].
But the section struck more deeply and more widely. Private discrim-
inations in housing were now not only free from Rumford and Unruh
but they also enjoyed a far different status than was true before the
passage of those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the
right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the
State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial
regulation at any level of the state government. Those practicing racial
discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal choice.
They could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from cen-
sure or interference of any kind from official sources."'
While section 26 did not command discrimination, its effect was to
encourage discrimination to an unconscionable degree, thereby re-
sulting in state involvement to an unconstitutional extent."' Section 26,
though concededly neutral on its face, was different because of the com-
bined effect of the section's enforcement and the preferred status it ac-
corded the right to discriminate.
26 unconstitutional, took notice of the Rumford Fair Housing Act (CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 35700-44 (West 1967)), which prohibits racial discrimination
in the sale or rental of any private dwelling containing more than four units. Id. at
§§ 35710, 35720. The enforcement of this statute also was tolled by operation of
section 26.
108. 387 U.S. at 373. Justice White authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas. Justice Douglas concurred, and
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 374.
111. 387 U.S. at 377.
112. Id. at 375-76. An alternative to the "state action" rationale espoused by the
Reitman Court, and a view which has received greater approval by commentators than
by the courts, is that of characterizing official inaction (the failure to provide needed
housing) as a basis for state action. "The state is responsible for what it could pre-
vent, and should prevent, and fails to prevent." Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 483 (1962). "Denying includes
inaction as well as action, and denying the equal protection of the laws includes the
omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection." United States
v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (No. 15,282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
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Dissenting in Reitman, Justice Harlan argued that the effect of sec-
tion 26 was merely to place California in a neutral position on the
housing discrimination question by the pro tanto repeal of the Rumford
and Unruh Acts. He added, however, that
[t]he fact that such repeal was also accompanied by a constitutional
prohibition against future enactment of such laws by the California
Legislature cannot well be thought to affect, from a federal constitutional
standpoint, the validity of what California has done.1 3
Even though Hunter involved a statute far more discriminatory on its
face than did Reitman, the dramatic shift in Justice Harlan's view
concerning the emphasis to be afforded the political effect of the
challenged statutes during the two years between the cases presents an
intriguing query.114 Section 26 barred all future open-housing legis-
lation, as opposed to merely placing referendum burdens on the
designated class. Nevertheless, neither Justice Harlan nor Justice
Stewart recognized a "political effect" issue in Reitman, while both
espoused the same in their later concurrences in Hunter. Similarly,
the failure of the Valtierra majority to expressly recognize the political
effect aspect of Article XXXIV in light of Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Hunter is noteworthy, and perplexing.
The Valtietra decision certainly places a limitation upon Reitman. If
a state statute exists which guarantees the right of all low-income per-
sons to secure safe, sanitary housing, and if a state constitutional
amendment similar to California's Article XXXIV were subsequently
enacted, it is doubtful, in light of Valtierra, whether the doctrine espoused
in Reitman could operate to render the amendment unconstitutional.
Valtierra thus evidences the contours of a new equal protection attitude
by the Court: wealth classifications are not, independently, to be ac-
corded suspect status, and the formulation of new fundamental interests
not founded directly under the Constitution is to be restricted by ill-
defined criteria within the Court's discretion.
The process of redefining protectable interests recently began in
Dandridge v. Williams," 5 where the Court refused to overturn a state
regulation which imposed a maximum per family allowance on per-
113. 387 U.S. at 389.
114. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra. The political effect issue is perhaps
even more strongly presented in Reitman than in Hunter. Section 26 took "[olut of
ordinary politics, out of the day-to-day process of legislative struggle and compromise,
the striving of Negroes and other racial minorities for the law's aid in clearing access to
decent housing, the thing they need the most." Black, Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HIAv. L. REv. 69, 76 (1967).
115. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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sons receiving funds under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program. In Dandridge the majority implied that application of
the Equal Protection Clause. to discriminatory wealth classifications
shall henceforth be limited to situations where the discrimination frus-
trates or otherwise impairs asserted individual interests explicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution.116 Stressing that the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights deserve special consideration, Justice Stewart, speaking for
the Court, stated:
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social
regulation as "overreaching" would be far too reminiscent of an era
when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to
strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought." That era long
ago passed into history .... 117
The position taken by the Dandridge Court, however, differs sharply
from the attitudes expressed in earlier cases."1 ' For example, in Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,"' the Court cogently observed:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more
than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions
of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change.
1 20
While the Valtierra majority failed to consult Dandridge, its reluctance
to inquire into Mrs. Valtierra's asserted rights, to determine whether a
fundamental interest was being impaired, bespeaks approval of that
earlier decision. Though the right to secure the construction of decent
housing may be fundamental,' 2 ' it is not explicitly guaranteed by the
116. Id. at 484. The Dandridge Court further implied that, even in the absence
of an infringement of a fundamental constitutional right, a statutory classification on
'the basis of race is sufficiently suspect to invoke rigid judicial scrutiny. Id. at 485
n.17. In so doing, however, the Court apparently denied that other classifications
(e.g., wealth, religion, caste) were sufficient in themselves to evoke strict scrutiny.
See id. at 484-85.
117. Id. at 484-85. (citations omitted).
118. Numerous decisions stand for the proposition that historic notions concerning
the scope of constitutional protections are subject to modification in light of present
experience. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
119. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
120. Id. at 669 (citation omitted) (holding that the imposition of a poll tax in state
elections is unconstitutional).
121. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
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Constitution as required by Dandridge. However, demanding that
there exist a literal constitutional source before a right may be deemed
"fundamental" within the equal protection jargon may be too rigid an
interpretation of Dandridge. Recently, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 2' decided subsequently to Valtierra, the Supreme Court
asserted that "when state statutory classifications approach fundamental
personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny. ... "I2 Thus,
fundamental personal rights appear sufficient now to command rigid
judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, since the Valtierra Court was unable
to find a constitutionally founded right, it applied the rational relation-
ship test in evaluating Article XXXIV. Clearly the provision complied
with this equal protection criterion:
[Article XXXIV] ensures that all the people of a community will have
a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local
governmental funds for increased public services and to lower tax rev-
enues. It gives them a voice in decisions that will affect the future
development of their own community.124
The Court observed that at the local level the supplying of necessary
local services represents the primary cost factor of low-income hous-
ing. "'25 However, the Court failed to recognize that higher community
costs were to some extent at least the implicit result of prior decisional
mandates abrogating state barriers to equal housing opportunities.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 126 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited state courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants in
private deeds to real property. Since alterations in the racial and eco-
nomic components of any area usually result in high dollar costs to its
local government, 27 the application of Shelley, of the Unruh Act in
Reitman, and of Akron's open housing statute in Hunter invariably ne-
cessitated profound changes in the social and political milieu of the com-
122. 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972) (holding that Louisiana's denial of equal recovery rights
under the state's workmen's compensation laws to dependent unacknowledged illegiti-
mates violates the Equal Protection Clause).
123. Id. at 1405, citing Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Schilb v. Kuebel,
404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
124. 402 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted).
125. The state is concerned basically with the increased costs of police, fire and
utility services, together with the construction and supply costs for new schools. These
costs must be borne primarily by the local government without recourse to any form
of property tax on the project premises. See note 7 supra.
126. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
127. Cf. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DisoRDERs
475-82 (1968) (unofficial report).
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munities concerned. As such, the Valtierra result counteracts the cost
increasing results of these prior decisions, and perhaps impedes the judi-
cial trend in favor of individual needs over community goals.
While the balancing of competing rights in an equal protection set-
ting is a judicial function,""8 the Valtierra Court accorded little weight to
the asserted right of indigents to the construction of decent housing,
relying on the democratic nature of the referendum process. In
what will undoubtedly be Valtierrds most often quoted passage, Justice
Black declared: "Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to
democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."' 29  With this
somewhat unrealistic characterization of Article XXXJV the Justice
concluded that the political effect of the Article is merely a "disadvan-
tage" to a potential low-income housing tenant:
[The plaintiffs] suggest that the mandatory nature of the Article XXXIV
referendum constitutes unconstitutional discrimination because it ham-
pers persons desiring public housing from achieving their objective
when no such roadblock faces other groups seeking to influence other
public decisions to their advantage. But of course a lawmaking pro-
cedure that "disadvantages" a particular group does not always deny
equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State would
not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums
were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some
group. And this Court would be required to analyze governmental
structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a
filibuster rule is likely to "disadvantage" any of the diverse and shifting
groups that make up the American people.
130
Certainly, however, Article XXXIV wreaks more than a "disadvan-
tage" upon particular groups. 131 Since low-income persons, by defini-
tion, are virtually unable to obtain construction funds through any means
other than governmental aid, the only viable alternative lies in the
repeal of Article XXXIV or similar enactments. In California, since
this must be accomplished through mandatory referendum,'32 such a
choice should be entitled to a more complimentary description than a
128. See generally Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 81 HAv. L. REv. 435, 437-38 (1967).
129. 402 U.S. at 141.
130. Id. at 142.
131. Since Article XXXIV was enacted in 1950, almost fifty percent of all low-in-
come housing units proposed have been rejected through the required referendum. As
a result, only 4 percent of the nation's low-income housing units may be found in
California, notwithstanding that 8 percent of all low-income Americans reside in this
state. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1970, at 28, col. 5.
132. CAL. CONST. art XVIIL
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mere "disadvantage." The majority's analysis is sound only if the pre-
sumption is made that the interest asserted by the Valtierra appellees is
not so fundamental as to be constitutionally protected, and that a
discriminatory classification based on wealth alone is not constitutionally
suspect. Otherwise, the proponents of Article XXXIV would have the
burden of showing a compelling state interest in the enforcement of that
article-a burden which would be difficult to establish in light of ex-
istent alternative measures which would preserve the valid interests
of the state.188 Additionally, should the compelling interest test be
invoked, an examination of the motivations behind the enactment of
Article XXXIV would be in order.'8 4 Though Article XXXIV did not
operate to repeal any previous statutory guarantees of adequate housing,
a partial motivation for its passage may be evidenced by contemporary
newspaper editorials drawing a relationship between low-income housing
projects and declining property values. 13
While Justice Douglas did not take part in the Valtierra decision, his
previously expressed view on the sanctity of referenda is noteworthy:
Wherever the real power in a government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Government the real power lies in the majority of
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be ap-
prehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere in-
strument of the major number of the Constituents. This is a truth of
great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to. .... 136
Herein lies the ultimate weakness in Justice Black's approach. The
133. For example, one method of removing the legislative burden on the poor im-
posed indirectly by Article XXXIV would be to allow referenda on the construction of
low-income housing, rather than to require them. The Valtierra appellants submitted
that Article XXXIV was adopted "not to create a special procedure for housing but to
bring housing within the traditional controls (through referenda]." Brief for Appel-
lant at 34, Shaffer v. Valtierra, Docket No. 226 (U.S., filed June 5, 1970). This con-
tention is sound in view of Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219
P.2d 457 (1950). See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra. But the Article
XXXIV scheme countenanced a far more extreme position. If a referendum were
not required (e.g., where repeal of a normal act of the Legislature is sought), op-
ponents of low-income housing may have been unable to obtain the signatures neces-
sary to compel a statewide vote on every proposed project. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 22. See Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 343 (1971).
134. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (recognizing that a statute's
effective repeal of prior statutes guaranteeing constitutional rights evidences a perni-
cious motive).
135. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1950, § 2, at 4, col. 3.
136. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 387 (Douglas J., concurring), citing 5 Wnrr-
INGS OF JAMFS MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904).
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exclusionary housing scheme countenanced by Article XXXIV has a
direct effect only upon a particular segment of the community. Though
the Valtierra majority cited several examples of other situations in which
a referendum is required by California law, 137 these required referenda
operate upon the community equally or proportionally and are not
restricted in their impact to a specific minority. These are merely
state constitutional provisions of general application, which "may
affect the poor more harshly than [they do] the rich," or which merely
reflect an "effort to redress economic imbalances."' 38  The persons
disadvantaged by these referenda requirements vary with the shifting
winds of the political process. It is difficult to perceive the relevance of
any one of these examples to the explicit limitations of Article XXXIV.
A majority of the Court appears clearly unwilling to accept the
McDonald view hinting that a statutory classification discriminating on
the basis of wealth would independently invoke the compelling state
interest standard of judicial review.'3 9  The majority is equally reluc-
tant to accord constitutionally protected status to a right to secure the
development of low-income housing. These two views, operating to-
gether, severely limit the principles established in Hunter and place
doubts upon the continuing validity of Reitman's inquiries into the dis-
criminatory effect of a statute neutral on its face. For the present,
potential low-income tenants are compelled to rely in the courts upon
the crutch of racial discrimination, and can well be faced, as were the
Valtierra appellees, with difficult problems of proof. The Court has
effectively closed one of its doors to the housing advocate, commanding
him to return to his legislature for further moves in the public housing
field. But in California the door to that body was shut tightly in 1950
through use of a constitutionally sanctioned mandatory referendum.
Thus, the responsibility passes as it must in any democracy worthy of
the name to the voter, who must find in his conscience the ultimate
answer.
Robert Cramer
137. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII (approved of state constitutional amendments); CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 40 (issuance of general obligation long-term bonds by local govern-
ments); CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 2(b) (certain municipal territorial annexations); and
CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 24(c) (the repeal of any statute first enacted by voter initiative).
138. 402 U.S. at 144 (Marshall, L, dissenting) (emphasis added), citing Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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